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How do military special operations officers make quick decisions in 
complex, fast-moving combat environments where the quality and speed of a 
decision could mean the difference between life and death? This qualitative study 
of Army and Navy special operations officers explores the factors that contribute 
to each individual’s decision-making process. The findings reveal that chaos is a 
function of enemy sensebreaking efforts, and to overcome this, leaders must first 
internalize the gravity of their current circumstances, a process referred to as 
“sense conversion.” After this point they are able to begin the sensemaking 
process that allows them to make an informed decision. This study led to a 
model of rapid decision making that revealed both the individual process as well 
as external factors, such as cohesion, that played critical roles in their ability to 
make decisions in chaos. 
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Since the onset of the global war on terrorism, the United States (U.S.) 
has deployed hundreds of thousands of soldiers into combat environments1 
spanning from the Middle East to Africa. Prior to September 11, 2001, only a 
small percentage of U.S. military members had much, if any, experience in direct 
combat.2 Although the conventional war has died down since the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, the role and reach of special operations forces (SOF) continue to 
increase. Much attention has been given to funding and training these forces to 
ensure that they are able to meet the challenges of a continually expansive 
enemy.3 With priorities shifting to a smaller military and decreased defense 
budget, it seems that SOF are being asked to do more with less.  
Given that SOF will increasingly be facing new environments around the 
globe, their ability to adapt to these environments and make the same efficient 
and rapid decisions under a flood of new environmental factors is a concern. 
Within special operations are two distinct missions with different environmental 
conditions. Special warfare is typically described as by, with and through 
operations, which focus on exerting influence to stabilize or destabilize a regime.4 
Conversely, surgical strike operations are typically more unilateral, direct action 
operations, such as kill/capture of high value targets and hostage rescue.5 During 
the execution of either of these types of missions, a chaotic incident outside of 
                                            
1 Dave Baiocchi, Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2013), 1–3. 
2 Nick Turse, “Why Are U.S. Special Operations Forces Deployed in Over 100 Countries?,” 
Nation, January 7, 2014, http://www.thenation.com/article/177797/why-are-us-special-operations-
forces-deployed-over-100-countries. 
3 Linda Robinson, “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, Council Special Report 66 (April 2013): 1–22.  
4 Dan Madden et al., “Special Warfare: The Missing Middle in U.S. Coercive Options,” War 
on the Rocks, November 20, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/special-warfare-the-
missing-middle-in-u-s-coercive-options/. 
5 Department of the Army, ADP 3–05 Special Operations (Washington, DC: Army Publishing 
Directorate, 2012), 8. 
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mission parameters could occur. It is the decision-making process that occurs 
during these incidents that is the focus of this study. These types of chaotic 
environments typically necessitate the ability to make rapid decisions.6  
The conditions under which the research participants of this study operate 
have primarily been direct-fire, combat environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
However, many of them have also been a part of special warfare missions, 
including those in contested environments and relatively ungoverned spaces. 
These environments are often characterized by highly uncertain, potentially life-
threatening conditions, with a high likelihood of exposure to rapid information 
flows and unique scenarios that test flexibility and responsiveness. In addition, 
factors external to their immediate environment, including accountability to 
superiors and pressure to produce results, often factor into the decision-making 
process. Much of the research in this area has focused on the decision-making 
process of civilian organizations, where change and the ability to make strategic 
decisions to meet the challenges of a changing environment are key to a 
businesses’ survival.7 However, research has not put as much focus on the 
decision-making process within a tactical setting, where rapid decisions in 
combat and contested environments can mean the difference in life or death.  
In combat, leaders practically never have all the information they want, 
and often have only an incomplete picture of the information they need.8 Every 
combat situation, especially in the case of counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency, can be unique; despite intensive training and contingency 
planning, one may never be truly prepared for what he is to face.9 For all small 
                                            
6 David J. Hickson et al., “Top Decisions: Strategic Decision-Making in Organizations (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986), 240. 
7 L. J. Bourgeois and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Strategic Decision Processes in High Velocity 
Environments: Four Cases in the Microcomputer Industry,” Management Science 34 (1988): 816. 
8 Ben Connable et al., Modeling, Simulation and Operations Analysis in Afghanistan and Iraq: 
Operational Vignettes, Lessons Learned, and a Survey of Selected Efforts (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2014), 14–15. 
9 Jason Rineheart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, 
no. 5 (2010), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/html. 
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units, such as SOF, factors are evaluated that determine whether the operation 
will commence; a shift in the balance often results in the mission being aborted. 
However, once an operation has been launched and the unit is thrust in the midst 
of a chaotic incident, the situation cannot be as tightly controlled. It is in these 
instances that the decision-making process of the leaders of these special 
operations units will be analyzed. In these particular situations, it may be that the 
meaning of the term “decision” might more aptly resemble “response,” in that the 
majority of the decisions that could be made in a tactical setting have already 
been pre-planned and rehearsed, but this will be explored in greater depth. 
Previous studies have examined related fields, such as firefighters and medical 
personnel,10 to examine rapid decision-making under time constraints. These 
studies found that knowledge and recognition of situational factors based on prior 
experience were the most critical factors leading to rapid decision-making. 
This thesis explores the decision-making process of SOF leaders under 
chaotic conditions and examines their ability to use multiple factors to overcome 
or avoid information overload. Two key research questions drove the research: 
(1) What does the decision-making process of SOF officers look like under highly 
chaotic conditions? (2) What are the most critical factors allowing SOF Officers to 
make rapid decisions under these conditions? Although each of the officers at 
the time of the interview were leaders within SOF, they were given the 
opportunity to select the specific experience they would discuss during their 
interview. For many, that included incidents that occurred while they were part of 
a special operations unit, but for others, they recounted experiences during their 
conventional military tours. This allowed for a cross-section of military experience 
that informed a model of tactical decision-making of leaders within both SOF and 
small conventional military elements. 
                                            
10 Gary A. Klein, Roberta Calderwood, and Anne Clinton-Cirocco, Rapid Decision Making on 
the Fire Ground (Technical Report 796) (Ft. Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the 
Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1985), 1–4; Andrea Baumann and Frances Bourbonnais, 
“Nursing Decision Making in Critical Care Areas,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 7, no. 5 (1982): 
435. 
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The results of this study show that the decision-making process of SOF 
Officers is based on a multi-layered model incorporating aspects of their 
selection, training, experience and team dynamics that effectively raises their 
ability to rapidly process information under chaotic conditions, allowing them to 
make decisions more quickly. The first key criterion separating SOF officers from 
those in other professions is their process of selection; these individuals are 
hand-picked based on a unique profile that determines their suitability for 
unconventional situations.11 This selection is followed by both individual and 
team training that develops unique skills and the proper mindset for the unusual 
circumstances to which they are exposed. These leaders first enter combat 
having trained heavily to familiarize themselves with a great deal of 
contingencies that may occur in a combat situation.12 They have, in essence, 
raised the level at which environmental complexity could enact a form of 
sensebreaking. Sensebreaking has been defined as the destruction or breaking 
down of ones understanding of a given circumstance or situation.13 For them, the 
term status quo refers not only to a mission going as planned, but also a mission 
in which a number of contingencies may have been addressed. Additionally, 
leaders are trained to rapidly engage in the sensemaking process, which is 
defined as the ability to recognize a fundamental change in the nature or reality 
of a given situation.14 Due to the nature of combat, leaders must also be 
prepared to operate on incomplete information.  
Small-unit leaders within SOF are then deployed to a wider range of 
environments, which increases the scope of their exposure and experiences as 
                                            
11 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, USAJFKSWCS 
Academic Handbook, FY2015 (Ft. Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special 
Warfare Center and School), http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/academichandbook.html. 
12 Carl Steiner, “U.S. Special Operations Forces: A Strategic Perspective,” Strategic Studies 
Institute, August 2, 1990, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1992/ 
1992%20stiner.pdf. 
13 Michael Pratt, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ambivalent: Managing Identification among 
Amway Distributors,” Administrative Science Quarterly 45, no. 3 (2000): 464. 
14 Dennis Gioia et al., “Symbolism and Strategic Change in Academia: The Dynamics of 
Sensemaking and Influence,” Organization Science 5, no. 3 (1994): 363. 
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compared to those in conventional units. This exposure to diverse tactical 
settings builds on the training received to insulate against sensebreaking,15 and 
continues to redefine what the term status quo means for these individuals. 
Throughout this entire process, a small-unit leader is developing relationships 
with his peers, and ultimately with the team that he will command, that further 
contributes to his ability to make rapid decisions in a chaotic environment. 
Finally, leaders fully understand the importance of making timely decisions,16 as 
well as the ramifications of making the wrong decision. As such, they treat their 
decision-making process as iterative, and continually strive to improve it. The 
result is a heightened ability that enables the small-unit leader to make decisions 
under unique and chaotic scenarios more efficiently and more quickly.  
  
                                            
15 Pratt, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ambivalent,” 464–467. 
16 Raymond Odierno, “CSA’s Remarks at Special Forces Qualification Course Graduation,” 
Army.mil, April 30, 2015, http://www.army.mil/article/147904/April_30__2015____CSA_s_ 
remarks_at_Special_Forces_Qualification_Course_graduation/. 
 6
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II. BACKGROUND 
Performance is linked to an individual’s ability to handle stress, a 
relationship represented by Yerkes and Dodson’s Inverted-U Model (see Figure 
1).17 Under changing and dynamic conditions, an individual often encounters a 
higher level of information and more complex information, and their stress levels 
increase until the individual reaches a point of information overload. This often 
results in a decline in decision quality, leading to decreased performance.18 The 
question then, is how can you increase an individual’s ability to maintain a high 
level of performance under chaotic circumstances? Herbert Simon addresses 
decision making in both uncertain and complex environments, using the theory of 
bounded rationality to account for different approaches to decision-making in 
environments that tax an individual’s ability to process vast amounts of 
information.19 He describes processes, such as satisficing and optimizing that 
allow for a reduction in the complexity of the environment, thus enabling an 
individual to begin the decision-making process.20  
  
                                            
17 James Manktelow, “The Pressure/Performance Dilemma,” June 28, 2011, http://www. 
mindtools.com/pages/Newsletters/28Jun11.htm. 
18 Mark Hwang and Jerry Lin, “Information Dimension, Information Overload and Decision 
Quality,” Journal of Information Science 25, no. 3 (1998): 216–217. 
19 Herbert Simon, “Theories of Bounded Rationality,” in Decision and Organization, eds. C. 
B. McGuire and Roy Radner (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1972), 161–176. 
20 Simon, “Theories of Bounded Rationality,” 170–171. 
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Figure 1.  Inverted-U Model 
 
Source: James Manktelow, “The Pressure/Performance Dilemma,” June 28, 
2011, http://www.mindtools.com/pages/Newsletters/28Jun11.htm. 
The complexity of the environment under combat conditions requires an 
elevated ability to rapidly make sense of dynamic factors and produce the best 
decision as expediently as possible. This sensemaking ability has been explored 
with regard to identity change21 and during periods of crisis,22 but scenarios 
examined in these studies differ significantly from the type of environment 
encountered in combat. Jensen and Brehmer come closer to analyzing this 
concept under what they term the “fog of war,” but their study did not focus on 
actions in the field, but rather on the command and control climate of military 
                                            
21 Gioia, “Symbolism and Strategic Change,” 363–365. 
22 Karl Weick, “Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations,” Journal of Management Studies 
25, no. 4 (1988): 305–306. 
 9
teams at a university.23 Their model better incorporates the factors associated 
with leadership sensemaking, the decision-making process and the factors of a 
team environment that contributed to the leaders’ decisions. However, the setting 
of their study was still more controlled and not representative of actual combat 
conditions. 
It should be noted that much of the literature on rapid decision making 
took place in organizations making strategic decisions. Although useful for 
identifying some of the similarities in process between strategic and tactical 
decisions, there are clear differences. For instance, Eisenhardt examined the 
decision-making process in high-velocity environments to determine which 
factors contributed to technology firms’ ability to make rapid strategic decisions.24 
This study was useful in examining how rapid decision-making was defined in a 
civilian organization and highlighted similar processes used by these 
organizations to those seen in a tactical environment, but still centered on 
strategic decisions. Some of the key factors identified included the use of higher 
quantity information, the consideration of multiple alternatives, and aspects of 
team dynamics, such as conflict resolution and assistance from advisors. Her 
findings contradicted previous conclusions in the field asserting that the 
consideration of fewer alternative options leads to quicker decisions.25 Moreover, 
she highlighted one factor in particular concerning the method of relying on 
centralized decision making for rapid strategic decisions,26 showing that, contrary 
to much of the available literature, fast decisions are not always best in a 
centralized structure. In her study, the key to a rapid decision depended more on 
                                            
23 Eva Jensen and Berndt Brehmer, “Sensemaking in the Fog of War: An Experimental 
Study of How Command Teams Arrive at a Basis for Action,” report for the 10th International 
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium—The Future of C2 (2005), 
Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden, 5–9. 
24 Kathleen Eisenhardt, “Making Fast Strategic Decisions in High-Velocity Environments,” 
Academy of Management Journal 32, no. 3 (1989): 543–576. 
25 Henry Mintzberg, “Strategy Making in Three Modes,” California Management Review 16 
(1973): 47. 
26 Eisenhardt, “Making Fast Strategic Decisions,” 561; James Driskell and Eduardo Salas, 
“Group Decision Making Under Stress,” Journal of Applied Psychology 76, no. 3 (1991): 473–474. 
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the experience and advice from experts in their field, rather than simply on the 
leader in charge. Many small-unit leaders, like the individuals interviewed for this 
study, would agree. Although the military generally follows a rigid hierarchy, and 
SOF as a whole retain a hierarchy, individual SOF teams deviate from this model 
due to their smaller unit size, more advanced training, and unconventional role.27 
This may be due in part to necessity, but they have also developed individual 
models over time, learning from experience and exposure through years of 
combat.  
Eisenhardt also examined the link between rapid decision-making and 
performance, determining that the speed of decisions was critical to the 
performance and survivability of businesses in rapidly changing environments.28 
However, the speed of decisions in her study ranged from 1.5 to 12 months, a 
timeframe suitable for strategic decisions in a business environment, but one that 
does not translate to tactical decision-making in combat environments. During 
patrols, raids, or other engagement activities in contested areas, the amount of 
time to make a decision can often be measured in seconds, occurring under 
highly intense and stressful conditions. More related to this current study would 
be Weick’s research into decision-making in crisis situations. In this study, Weick 
argues that poor sensemaking in chaotic situations leads to prolonged and 
intensified chaos. This highlights the importance of the ability of special 
operations leaders to cope effectively with chaos in combat.29  
Beyond severe time constraints, many studies have addressed the role 
that training and experience play in developing cognitive and physiological 
                                            
27 Patrick Lohaus, “A Precarious Balance: Preserving the Right Mix of Conventional and 
Special Operations Forces,” American Enterprise Institute, September 8, 2014, http://www.aei. 
org/publication/a-precarious-balance-preserving-the-right-mix-of-conventional-and-special-
operations-forces/. 
28 Eisenhardt, “Making Fast Strategic Decisions,” 567–570. 
29 Weick, “Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations,” 305–307. 
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responses under times of stress.30 Gasaway ultimately asserts that information 
gaps are addressed by applying intuition that is gained from experience in the 
field. In a previous study, Weick highlights not only the importance of 
understanding such information gaps, but also comprehending that multiple 
players are involved in a chaotic environment who are also operating with similar 
limitations.31 There are multiple ways to handle uncertainty in these situations; 
these are often addressed prior to conducting an operation through processes, 
such as rehearsal, contingency planning, and intelligence collection. Although 
this may reduce uncertainty, the environment remains complex, particularly for 
special operations leaders who are responsible for leading their team, combatting 
the enemy, communicating effectively with their headquarters, and working with 
local indigenous leaders. 
However, although these studies examine the factor of exposure to high-
risk conditions, they do not include tactical combat environments. In many of the 
cases included in this study, the participants were faced with unique 
circumstances in which they had very little real-world experience. In fact, when 
asked to describe a chaotic experience, many of the participants chose examples 
from earlier portions of their career. This implies that as experience was gained it 
allowed for the formation of intuition, which made future iterations of similar 
circumstances seem challenging rather than chaotic; the formation of such 
intuition is described by Gasaway.32 The aforementioned articles described how 
training and experience enhance an individual’s ability to respond to high levels 
of stress while maintaining high levels of performance, essentially increasing 
their baseline along the Inverted-U model. However, further research is required 
to understand how this translates to a combat environment. The Department of 
                                            
30 Richard Gasaway, “Making Intuitive Decisions under Stress: Understanding Fireground 
Incident Command Decision-Making,” International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and 
Management 1, no. 1 (2007): 12. 
31 Karl Weick, “The Vulnerable System: An Analysis of the Tenerife Air Disaster,” Journal of 
Management 16, no. 3 (1990): 571–572. 
32 Gasaway, “Making Intuitive Decisions under Stress,” 9. 
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the Army directly points to a leader’s experience as being a crucial factor in his 
ability to make a decision,33 but the changing combat environment warrants a 
holistic review of all of the factors contributing to the decision-making process.  
The importance and confluence of factors that can either inhibit or assist 
the speed of a tactical decision can vary significantly from one where time is not 
as critical a factor. Again, previous literature has explored some aspects of the 
speed of tactical decision-making, as well as related professions to determine 
critical components of a rapid decision-making process, identifying training, 
experience, and information flow as key factors impacting this process.34 The 
current study aims to incorporate speed as one key factor influencing the 
decision-making process and aims to use a qualitative methodology to examine 
additional factors in greater depth. 
                                            
33 Department of the Army, ADP 6–22 Army Leadership (Washington, DC: Army Publishing 
Directorate, 2012), 1–4. 
34 Department of the Army, ADP 6–0, 6; Jennifer Kavanagh, Stress and Performance: A 
Review of the Literature and its Applicability to the Military (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2005), 18; Kathleen Kowalski-Trakofler, Charles Vaught, and Ted Scharf, “Judgment 
and Decisionmaking under Stress: An Overview for Emergency Managers,” International Journal 
of Emergency Management 1, no. 3 (2003): 5–7. 
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III. METHODS 
The selection process for this research study was one of purposeful 
sampling of the research participants,35 in which individuals were chosen based 
on their ability to provide information relevant to rapid decision-making in chaotic 
environments. The group of participants studied were all U.S. Armed Forces 
Officers currently serving as graduate students. Each participant was screened to 
ensure that they had been actively involved in leadership positions in either 
combat or contested environments in which they had to make decisions affecting 
themselves and their team members. Finally, the group of potential participants 
was restricted to either Army or Navy special operations officers, ensuring not 
only a high level of exposure to chaotic environments, but also that there were 
comparison groups with which to confirm or disconfirm inferences.36 The final 
group of participants were composed of SOF team leaders with a rank equivalent 
of captains, majors and lieutenant colonels in the Army or lieutenants, lieutenant 
commanders and commanders in the Navy. The majority of the participants have 
served in leadership positions on multiple combat tours, with total time of military 
service ranging from 9 to 24 years. Due to the nature of SOF structure, mission 
and combat exposure, female military officers and officers from the Air Force and 
Marines were excluded, due to either inconsistent exposure to ground combat 
operations or lack of availability within the current student body. This follows the 
methodology of grounded theory as described by Glaser and Strauss.37  
The primary collection method of this study was the use of semi-structured 
interviews targeting a specific incident occurring in a chaotic environment that 
involved the research participants’ decision-making process. Prior to any 
                                            
35 Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1985), 201–
202.  
36 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1984), 
47–48. 
37 Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), 49–58. 
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interviews, approval was granted by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of the university. Following approval, a total of 24 
interviews were conducted, with each research participant undergoing a 1–2 hour 
interview conducted by a member of the 9-person research team. The authors of 
this study were part of the research team and conducted five of the 24 interviews. 
Initial interviews were conducted by a two-member research team composed of a 
military and civilian member to better establish rapport with the research 
subject.38 Subsequent interviews were conducted by individual members of the 
research team. All of the interviews were then collected and stored according to 
IRB standards, and approval was granted for use of the dataset for this study.39  
Each interview comprised a number of main questions designed to elicit 
key components of the research subjects’ experience that centered on decision-
making in chaotic environments.40 The research team was also instructed and 
prepared to ask both probes and follow-up questions to elicit details and 
clarifying information on the experience being discussed. The interviews were 
designed to be flexible, iterative, and continuous; as such the interviewers 
allowed for new concepts to emerge, then the ability to narrow the focus as 
themes emerged, and finally to adjust throughout the process.41 In some 
instances, research participants were contacted following the interview to obtain 
further information during the data analysis process.42 
                                            
38 Herbert Rubin and Irene Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (3rd ed.) 
(Los Angeles: Sage, 2012), 49–51. 
39 Frank Barrett, “Combat Leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan—A Qualitative Investigation 
Into Decision-Making in Chaotic Environments,” Dataset, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, (NPS 
IRB#NPS.2015.0027-IR-EP7-A). Note: All direct quotes, unless otherwise specified, as well as all 
stories described in this thesis were derived from the dataset corresponding to NPS 
IRB#NPS.2015.0027.0027-IR-EP7-A. 
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The research team followed Glaser and Strauss’s method of Grounded 
Theory.43 The theoretical sampling process was pursued, allowing each research 
team member to collect, code and analyze the data simultaneously. Researchers 
employed the method of comparative analysis to generate categories and 
conceptual properties of the data collected. This allowed for a process of 
delineating themes and aggregate dimensions.44 This process was repeated until 
the research team determined that theoretical saturation45 had been reached, at 
which point further data collection was not necessary.46 
Upon completion of the interviews, recordings were transcribed to allow 
for coding. Initial data analysis employed the use of open coding, which grouped 
first order codes,47 also termed informant codes, into categories. Next, the 
researchers used axial coding48 to explore and identify the relationships between 
first-order codes and organize them into higher-order themes. Finally, higher-
order themes were examined and organized into overarching dimensions that led 
to the identification of a preliminary model. In keeping with grounded theory 
generation, conceptual categories were noted throughout the coding process.49 
The data was repeatedly re-examined during the data collection and analysis 
process following an iterative approach to ensure that new data was incorporated 
                                            
43 According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), Grounded Theory is the discovery of theory from 
data. Unlike quantitative research methods, which are theory generating, grounded theory is a 
qualitative process the uses comparative analysis to generate theory from data. This allows for a 
ground up approach that provides the researcher with relevant predictions, explanations, 
interpretations and applications from their data. 
44 Gioia, “Symbolism and Strategic Change,” 368. 
45 Glaser and Strauss (1967) define theoretical saturation as the stopping point for 
theoretical sampling after it has been determined that additional data will not provide new 
properties for a category. This point is achieved through a process of joint collection and analysis 
of the data whereby no more differences are noted. There are a number of criteria to determine 
theoretical saturation, including a combination of the empirical limits of the data, the integration 
and density of the theory, and the analyst’s theoretical sensitivity. 
46 Glaser and Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, 61. 
47 John Van Maanen, “The Fact of Fiction in Organizational Ethnography,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly 24 (1979): 540–541. 
48 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory (2nd ed.) (London: Sage, 2014), 147–
148. 
49 Glaser and Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, 22–24. 
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and the conceptual framework adjusted as necessary.50 This process was 
repeated until new data did not provide any additional substantive content or 
insight into current categories, themes or dimensions, resulting in theoretical 
saturation.51 
To ensure the trustworthiness of the data,52 the data collection and 
analysis process incorporated multiple steps. First, the interview data were 
organized and very clearly coded to identify first-order codes. Then, each 
individual code was manually entered into a computer program and further 
analyzed to identify patterns within the data. Additionally, during initial data 
collection, the identification of patterns in the data were discussed among the 
research team and an experienced qualitative researcher. This allowed for 
additional perspectives to be included in the data analysis process and to ensure 
adherence to the Grounded Theory Process.53 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The first step in the data analysis process was the compilation and 
transcription of each interview. Each member of the research team was 
responsible for the transcription of the interviews they personally conducted 
which generally ranged from one to three interviews apiece. The interviews were 
transcribed manually to allow for the capture of subtle nuances and to protect the 
identity of the research participants. Upon completion of the interview 
transcription process, all interview transcriptions were then collected in a central 
repository for use as a dataset for further research and analysis. The authors of 
this thesis were part of the original research team and were granted access to 
the dataset for this very purpose. The dataset included 26 interviews, which the 
authors then each analyzed and coded for this thesis.  
Data analysis of all 26 interviews resulted in 646 first-order codes, 16 
second-order themes, and six overarching dimensions (see Figure 2). To 
illustrate the progression through the coding process and the resulting insights, 
each of the overarching dimensions will be discussed in detail. Each of these 
sections will be comprised of a set of second-order themes, which will be 
accompanied by tables containing excerpts of first-order codes. The data 
analysis process will culminate in a model illustrating the decision-making 
process that highlights the role and placement of the overarching dimensions 
within this process. 
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Figure 2.  Data Analysis: Themes and Dimensions 
 
 
A. STATUS QUO 
Understanding how small-unit leaders make decisions in chaos requires 
an understanding of what the term status quo means to the participants of this 
study. These men have gone through basic military training, undergone a 
rigorous selection process to move into special operations, and have often 
received years of advanced training prior to serving on their teams for an initial 
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deployment.54 Additionally, the deployment tempo is much more frequent than is 
seen by more conventional military units.55 As such, the type and intensity of 
combat that these men are prepared to view as simply routine is relatively high, 
even when compared to other combat units.56 For example, leading patrols in the 
middle of the night in an insurgent infested sector of a combat zone is referred to 
as “routine” or “basic,” by those interviewed in this study.57  
In one example, a combat leader discussed a particular mission in which 
his definition of status quo would certainly exceed the realm of routine. His team 
had received time-sensitive intelligence on the location of a high value terrorist 
target. They quickly used this information to conduct a rapid mission planning 
session to execute a time-sensitive raid aimed at capturing the target. In an 
attempt to use the element of surprise, they elected to operate under the cover of 
darkness and off-set their tactical insertion site to minimize the possibility of 
being heard as they closed in on the target. This was especially crucial, as the 
target area was a known hotbed for terrorist activity. Within a few minutes of 
arriving, the team leader began to receive intelligence from radio intercepts that 
the enemy was fully aware of their presence, despite his team’s attempt at 
stealth. He also received reports of potential enemy personnel moving from the 
intended target building into a neighboring building.58  
He quickly assessed the potential threat resulting from the enemy radio 
communication as an acceptable risk, and assessed that his team strength was 
sufficient to secure both the original target building and also the neighboring one. 
As he led his team further down a ravine toward the compound, sporadic gunfire 
                                            
54 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Academic 
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alification_Course_graduation/. 
57 Barrett, NPS IRB. 
58 Barrett, NPS IRB. 
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erupted. Both he and his teammates recognized it as fire from a large caliber 
weapon, but felt that it was not precisely directed enough to qualify as an 
immediate threat, despite the fact that the enemy rounds were essentially flying 
directly overhead. He had accepted the hostile nature of the area and the sound 
of the enemy firing in the distance as more routine than cautionary.59  
As they proceeded under the cover of darkness toward the target, they 
were provided intelligence that people in the target building were possibly using 
night vision devices, which would make his team far easier to see. While many 
people would find this news alarming, the leader simply reckoned that this 
possibility only served to confirm the validity that the team was headed toward 
the right location.60 His responses during the situation described illustrate what is 
meant by status quo to special operations leaders. The question that follows is, 
what changes might better prepare these leaders for the hostile and often 
complex challenges they are apt to face?  
1. Selection 
Yeah, so I was selected and trained for my capacity to do that, to 
problem solve quickly, make decisive calls…and make the 
decisions. But I’ll tell you it takes a long time to get to that point. 
 —Survey Subject 6 
 
Before soldiers even begin their training to become a SOF Officer they 
undergo a selection process to evaluate their potential to perform effectively 
under the stressful and chaotic conditions they are likely to face. Many do not 
pass this evaluation. This is a rigorous process that determines their capability to 
adapt and adjust to ambiguous and often contentious circumstances and to make 
rapid decisions under high-risk conditions.61 This is the first step in choosing 
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individuals that will naturally operate under much more stressful conditions at a 
higher level than the normal population.  
As described by the participants in this study, for those in SOF, it is not 
just a job, but a calling. As seen in Table 1, SOF members are drawn to both the 
elite status of these units, as well as the challenge that comes with its 
membership. Multiple participants described their draw to the SOF community as 
immediate and irresistible. For many, their first exposure to SOF units made 
them realize that is what they wanted to do. One participant described his first 
experience with members of a SOF unit when he underwent basic training with 
fellow soldiers headed to the Special Forces. Immediately, he knew that was 
something he was interested in and wanted to pursue. Further exposure 
immediately following his training solidified that decision. “Yeah, this is definitely 
what I want to do…I just liked the way that they operated and wanted to 
challenge myself and be surrounded by other soldiers that were the best at what 
they did.”62 In their own words, participants described the high caliber of 
individuals within SOF. The members of these units had a level of maturity and 
professionalism that they respected, which increased their interest and desire to 
be a part of these units.  
Table 1.   Selection 
 
The research participants in this study specifically sought out positions 
within SOF to challenge themselves and join units that would face more diverse 
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and intense environments. As one participant put it, “I didn’t join Special Forces 
to sit behind a desk…I wanted to be in the mix of things…I wanted to lead men in 
combat.”63 This unique personality trait held true throughout our group of 
participants. One SOF team leader had difficulty putting it into words. He did not 
want to sound like a thrill-seeker, a character trait often applied to those in the 
SOF community. In the beginning of his career, he was a member of the 
conventional military and found that he enjoyed being in combat, but did not want 
to state it in those terms. In fact, after initially stating that he had liked being in 
combat, he went back and said that was a bad term, that it could be 
misinterpreted. However, being in combat was a major draw for him. After 
working as an augmentee with an Army Special Forces unit known as an 
Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) for only 24 hours, he realized, “hey, I want 
to go do that.” Being in combat, and more specifically being a member of the 
SOF community made him feel like he “was part of something bigger.” He 
immediately applied to Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and 
became a member of this elite organization.64 
This selection of individuals that are naturally inclined to seek out more 
challenging environments, coupled with both elevated physical and behavioral 
baselines ensures that as their levels of stress increase, they are able to 
maintain better levels of performance under more adverse conditions. As one 
participant put it, “everyone responds to trauma differently,” so selection is critical 
to ensure that key traits are present, while eliminating those individuals that 
cannot operate under these conditions.65  
One individual in particular experienced a roller coaster of emotions that 
could have induced a very negative emotional response. However, those within 
the SOF community are selected for their ability to react and adapt to dynamic 
and adverse circumstances. The participant was deployed to Colombia as a 
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Special Forces Team Leader. During this deployment, he was able to fly home to 
see the birth of his son, which is often not a possibility for many soldiers, 
particularly those in leadership positions. However, they were not in a highly 
chaotic environment, so he was able to spend five days at home and then return 
to Colombia. However, within a week of his return, his unit was responding to 
indirect fire by the enemy. Then, less than two weeks later, he was back at home 
with his family. In his words, “It was a really bizarre three-and-a-half weeks. Kind 
of emotional, but not what I thought it would be.” For many, “bizarre” would not 
be the term they would use, but this individual was screened and selected for his 
ability to remain calm under chaotic circumstances.66 Again, this illustrates the 
caliber of individuals selected for these types of units, a process that incorporates 
multiple steps to screen those capable of filling these roles. 
To make this determination, multiple personality tests are administered 
during the selection process, which assists the selection officer in his evaluation 
of each candidates’ personality profile.67 However, although it has been shown 
that personality plays a role in the ability to handle stress,68 selection also 
includes multiple field tests, enabling selection officials the opportunity to 
evaluate each candidate’s ability to make decisions within replicated high-stress 
environments, as both individuals and as part of a team,69 the latter of which will 
become crucial when put in real-world scenarios. 
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2. Training 
Our unit level training is far more difficult than deployment, far more 
difficult. 
 — Survey Subject 13 
 
Following the selection process, SOF Officers undergo extensive training, 
both as individuals and with their respective teams.70 Through analysis of SOF 
interviews, this was one of the critical factors contributing to their ability to make 
rapid decisions (see Table 2). Critical to both of these training environments is 
the inculcation of standard operating procedures (SOPs) through battle drills. 
SOPs lay the groundwork for typical operating procedures in a multitude of 
different operating environments and are essentially a framework within which 
each military unit operates. This foundation could not have been more clearly 
enunciated by our research participants.  
Table 2.   Training 
 
 
The SOF participant with the longest tenure in our research study 
repeatedly referenced the importance of establishing and rehearsing SOPs. 
Having deployed to countries in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, he 
recounted his experiences in Northern Iraq in the early part of Operation Iraqi 
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Freedom. On a routine combat patrol, his unit was following their action plan 
exactly as directed. They had modified their vehicles to adapt to the unique 
environment they found themselves in and had an SOP for the direction the guns 
would be facing. Suddenly, he noticed something that “didn’t seem quite right.” 
He immediately identified the threat from two individuals in an alley way and 
opened fire. Within seconds, his unit was receiving fire from other enemy 
personnel in what would turn out to have been a well-laid ambush. Direct fire 
came from every side. He had to make a decision and quickly. Relying on his 
training and the multitude of SOPs ingrained over the years, he gave the order to 
push into the ambush—a decision that may seem counter-intuitive—but this was 
a tactic that he remembered as “an old trick from Vietnam.”71 
Fortunately, his unit was able to break through the ambush and get 
enough separation to evaluate the state of their personnel and vehicles. They 
had not suffered any casualties and everything was operational, so he had to 
make another decision. Do they return to base or re-engage the enemy while 
they still have all of their capabilities and maintain the initiative? At this point, he 
realized that demonstrating the will to fight against the enemy was the right 
course of action so they returned to the ambush site and awaited support from 
conventional forces nearby. Throughout the engagement, he refers back to 
SOPs, covering everything from weapons systems to vehicle placement to 
patterns of movement during the firefight.72 Without these principles to rely on, 
and the associated quick reactions and streamlining of available courses of 
action, this event could have been catastrophic. 
In addition to SOPs that assist leaders in creating the foundation for action 
in a multitude of settings, the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) assists 
the military decision-maker by defining roles and responsibilities within their chain 
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of command and helps them develop courses of actions.73 Although this is a 
beneficial process for the majority of the military, it is less relevant in chaotic 
tactical settings, as the MDMP can be a time-consuming process, and when 
faced with scenarios requiring rapid decision-making, SOF Officers need to 
adjust quickly.74 As one participant put it, “MDMP plays no part in a combat zone, 
in combat.” He explained that it helps in the planning phase, but once in combat, 
you “just don’t have time, if you wait and think about it at all, someone gets 
hurt.”75 So how do they develop the ability to be more adaptable? One of the key 
tools allowing them to do so is through advanced training and exposure to unique 
training scenarios during exercises.  
Individual training is designed to expose these leaders to situations where 
they are often faced with moral and ethical dilemmas requiring a decision under 
extreme time constraints. This type of training starts to condition them to become 
adaptable to the dynamic environment in which they will be operating. It also 
exposes them to a diverse range of scenarios that allow them to become more 
familiar with the type of events they might encounter in combat. That way, even if 
they are facing a situation in combat that does not exactly replicate training, they 
are able to react and respond. One participant felt this firsthand as he faced an 
enemy ambush that was well organized and had substantial firepower. As he 
described it, he had not practiced that exact type of ambush, had not seen an 
adversary with the same capabilities and in those numbers. However, he had 
been exposed to similar training simulations and was therefore familiar with some 
of the elements present; as such, he was able to make sense of the chaotic 
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situation, come up with an appropriate course of action, and execute it without 
being overwhelmed.76 
Team training also serves a distinct purpose by forcing the leader to start 
interacting with and developing relationships with his fellow team members. 
Group training creates an environment that fosters higher levels of comradery 
and cohesion within the team that has been cited as a critical factor for the 
performance of SOF teams in combat.77 However, although team members start 
to become more cohesive during training, experiences in combat greatly 
influence the levels of cohesion within a team, as will be discussed in greater 
depth.  
Similar to individual training, the team also conducts extensive rehearsals 
of real-life scenarios, a process that repeats itself until reaction to certain 
conditions becomes automatic.78 In this case, they are instilling a reflex, but one 
that is effective and reduces risk associated with delayed responses in dynamic, 
high-risk situations. In one participant’s words, this type of training allows the 
operator to instantly react, so that “when it comes time, it can be a reflex, not a 
conscious thought or memory.”79 Rehearsal also serves to identify variations on 
training scenarios, alternative courses of action and the development of 
contingencies,80 specifically as a member of a team. As one member of the study 
described it, they are constantly “sketching alternatives.”81 This builds a level of 
improvisation that can be key to operating within highly uncertain conditions.82 
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With so many potential variables to consider, the ability to rapidly cycle through 
options and reach the most effective solution is key to the decision-making 
process.83 
These types of training are the first step to instill key operational principles 
that serve as the foundation for action in combat. In fact, many research 
participants described the need to fall back on your training, describing how 
“training kicks in” in combat, and the need to “rely on principles.” Although no 
situation in combat is going to exactly replicate training, the “principles remain the 
same.”84 This type of advanced training, rehearsal and exposure to situations 
requiring considerations of contingencies elevates the SOF operator to be more 
adaptable and more responsive to the type of complex environments that they 
will face in combat. 
Ultimately, if enough variation and complexity is experienced in training 
scenarios, the combat environment will feel far less chaotic when missions do not 
go exactly as planned. As a result, these leaders are well conditioned to expect 
the unexpected. This is especially crucial when conducting operations in areas 
where the enemy is known to present a constant threat.  
One particular informant shared an exemplar of this scenario when he 
discussed his near-constant expectation of a firefight. During this time, he had 
been leading his team on numerous missions in a very dangerous part of 
Afghanistan. In fact, the area they were operating in was so known for its 
violence that it was featured in a documentary on the National Geographic 
Channel. When asked about any apprehension he had felt when facing such a 
deployment, he said only that he was looking forward to being “in the mix of 
things” and that he believed he knew exactly what he was getting himself into, 
which was, as he put it, “the Wild West.”85 Throughout his time, the mountainous 
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operating area limited options for movement, making his team an easy 
improvised explosive device (IED) target every time they ventured away from 
their firebase. Despite this constant threat of enemy strike, he was able to lead 
his team effectively and aggressively by always staying alert and trying to 
anticipate the ways in which an attack could unfold at any moment.  
This constant focus on real and potential threats was echoed throughout 
the interviews by all informants in this study. One commented, “We knew we 
were going in to a bad place on the get go,” while another highlighted the manner 
in which his training prepared him for such an environment saying, “our unit level 
training is far more difficult than deployment, far more difficult.”86 As a result, 
when chaotic situations arose, the participants were able to rely on their training 
and internalize would-be chaos as routine or quickly fall back to a contingency 
plan crafted as a result of anticipating potential enemy attacks. For SOF leaders, 
training was intended to be two-fold. First, leaders were conditioned to expect 
highly uncertain and potentially chaotic conditions. Second, they were given tools 
to help them cope with and make decisions under these conditions.   
B. COMBAT SENSEBREAKING 
The process of sensebreaking has been applied to a number of scenarios 
in previous studies. Typically, it describes the process whereby one’s 
understanding of a situation or process is effectively disrupted or destroyed.87 
However, in combat, especially from the perspective of small units in a tactical 
setting, sensebreaking is unique. It is therefore important to define and describe 
such characteristics to understand how they impact the decision-making process 
examined in this study. As illustrated in Table 3, the data shows that combat 
sensebreaking has two unique attributes: sensebreaking by the enemy and 
sensebreaking from team-internal factors.  
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Table 3.   Combat Sensebreaking 
 
 
1. Sensebreaking by the Enemy 
Despite thorough selection, intensive training, and previous combat 
experience, it is not possible to prepare for every potential scenario in combat; it 
is when these unknown scenarios arise that the environment adopts a chaotic 
feel.88 This feeling of chaos is indicative of combat sensebreaking. There are two 
distinct ways in which the enemy has shown a capability to induce combat 
sensebreaking: the first occurs when the enemy demonstrates an unexpected or 
new tactic, while the second occurs when the enemy engages a team at an 
unexpected time. 
As described by the participants in the study, when the enemy utilizes 
unexpected tactics it elicits a level of confusion or frustration. Previous solutions or 
courses of action may no longer be viable often leaving leaders unsure of how to 
proceed. In one particular case, a participant discussed his time as a new platoon 
leader in a conventional unit. While on a routine patrol he took his platoon to 
inspect a black market fuel point known as a terrorist meeting point. As an illegal 
area of fuel sales, it was common to see empty fuel cans strewn about the area.89 
However, what one team member discovered was anything but common.  
While searching the area for any signs of terrorist activity and displaying a 
military force presence to discourage future enemy activity, a team member 
upturned an empty fuel can to discover it was rigged as an IED and was wired to 
                                            
88 Weick, “Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations,” 305. 
89 Barrett, NPS IRB. 
 31
an artillery shell. Concurrently, the rear element of the young leader’s team 
began to receive small arms fire from an unidentifiable location. Unknowingly, 
this platoon leader had found himself in the middle of a complex enemy attack.90  
He described his feelings in that moment, saying that he felt his heartrate 
rise and a general overall escalation of his physical and cognitive processes. At 
this point, his radio lit up with calls relaying reports of enemy fire and potential 
enemy movement while, for the first time in combat, he himself heard the distinct 
sound of gunfire overhead. IEDs were ubiquitous at the time, but IEDs followed 
by direct fire engagement were a newer phenomenon. The platoon leader was 
forced to face a tactic for which he had found himself unprepared.91 It was both 
the unique feeling of first exposure and the unexpected complexity of the attack 
that induced combat sensebreaking for the young leader. 
However, unexpected timing proves to be even more effective at combat 
sensebreaking. In combat, unexpected timing often refers to a split second 
occurrence; this can happen as fast as the wheel of a vehicle crossing an IED or a 
shot from a gun. Its rapid nature instills an emotional shock, which can have an 
immediate effect of sensebreaking. This type of rapid sensebreaking was 
epitomized by a situation described by one participant. He was serving the sixth 
month of his first combat deployment in Iraq. As a new platoon leader he had to 
rapidly adjust to what he referred to as a steep learning curve on a nearly daily 
basis. However, by this point in his deployment, a night patrol enforcing a 
governmental curfew was considered routine. He had not noticed anything 
remarkable during this patrol, not even the small fire he saw burning in the middle 
of the road seemed considerably out of place. In this part of Iraq it was common for 
the locals to burn their trash roadside, so there was no reason for alarm. However, 
he felt that it was just bizarre enough to warrant further investigation.92  
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The platoon leader ordered his column of five Humvees to approach the 
flame and upon arrival, did not notice anything unusual…at first. His primary 
concern leading the vehicle patrol was the threat of an IED, but that is not what 
he encountered. Once the first vehicle came to a stop there was a moment of 
calm followed shortly by enemy gunfire from both the rear and right of the 
convoy. He had led his team directly into an ambush.93 The use of an ambush is 
a tactic commonly used in warfare, but when properly executed, its unexpected 
timing can still be effective at combat sensebreaking. Sitting in the second 
vehicle, the platoon leader could do little more than watch his first vehicle take 
direct machinegun fire. He could see the gunner in the first vehicle get shot and 
fall into the vehicle from the hatch. His reaction was to order the driver of his own 
vehicle to act as a shield by driving in front of the one being assaulted. At this 
moment, he was able to do little more than sit scrunched in a Humvee seat while 
his vehicle was pelted with automatic fire.94 As a result, the enemy had taken the 
upper hand by launching an effective ambush at an unexpected time.  
It is by executing the unexpected, such as this ambush, that the enemy is 
able to either exceed the limitations of training, contingency planning and 
experience, or simply catch a team off-guard and leave them reeling to regain 
control of the situation.  
2. Sensebreaking from Within 
There are at least two sides to any battle. While the enemy can present an 
obstacle to any leader, so too can his own team. These teams are typically both 
highly trained and well-practiced as a unit.95 As such, there is an expected 
reduction in tactical execution issues. However, circumstances in which the team 
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experiences a diminished combat capacity, or in circumstances in which team 
cohesion has not been fully developed, significant issues can arise.96  
As the participants described in their interviews, wounded team members, 
failures of communications equipment and vehicle malfunctions all serve as 
alarms that the mission is now in a state of chaos. This diminished combat 
capacity can quickly lead to combat sensebreaking. In some instances, tactical 
leaders must be concerned with both their own team’s capacity, as well as with 
that of a unit from a partner nation, further complicating the situation. One 
interview participant shared such an experience.  
While conducting a joint patrol with a partner nation’s Special Forces 
team, the collective group came under direct small arms and grenade fire from a 
concealed enemy contingent. While his team performed as expected, the partner 
force proved ineffective. A member of this force sustained a gunshot wound; 
procedures clearly dictate that the casualty should be treated quickly and 
evacuated when possible. However, the participant elaborated, “What actually 
happened in real time though, the [partner force] platoon just basically watched 
this guy get shot in the neck and fall over at their feet. They both stopped firing 
and did nothing to treat their friend.”97  
Additionally, high intensity firefights illuminated team cohesion issues in 
which leaders realized their subordinates felt a diminished confidence in the 
leader’s decision-making ability. In the scope of this study, the diminished 
confidence did not stem from a lack of confidence in the leader’s skill set, but 
from a lack of shared combat experience. One leader described having 
confidence issues from his team, as he had only been newly minted as a team 
leader when he joined the team two months prior to the deployment. This lack of 
developed cohesion came to a head as arguments ensued among the team 
while trying to determine whether to reengage the enemy or exfiltrate a contested 
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area after an ambush. Arguments erupting with regard to courses of action while 
under-fire are a definite sign of combat sensebreaking as they indicate friction 
between a decision maker and his subordinates.98  
a. Injury to Teammate 
Operations can go on despite injury or death; in fact, one study concluded 
that injuries to a teammate actually led to a higher commitment to the ongoing 
mission.99 However, beyond the estimation of combat ground power and the 
logistical need to recover the wounded, leaders faced the injury of their 
subordinates with even more concern than the possible injury to themselves. 
One participant succinctly stated what many had intoned, “My first thought was 
the safety of the guys.”100 As a result, teammate injuries swiftly lead to combat 
sensebreaking by quickly and convincingly demonstrating the heightened 
intensity of a tactical situation.  
In one instance, a team leader was maneuvering his unit in position to 
conduct an assault on an enemy compound. Prior to commencement, the enemy 
opened fire on the team leading to a severe head wound to one subordinate and 
a chest wound to the other. In the leader’s mind, the welfare of these two men 
became his primary mission.101 This reaction was common among the 
participants of the study when facing similar situations. It is significant in that an 
injury to a teammate signals to a leader that the mission is clearly no longer 
going as planned. In severe circumstances, this can leave a leader confounded 
in the middle of combat, unsure of what to do next; this is the direct effect of 
combat sensebreaking. Some leaders overcome this state better than others and 
move on to the next phases of the decision-making process. In combat, this 
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ability can significantly impact the safety of the rest of the team and the likelihood 
that those already critically injured will survive.  
b. Threat to Life 
Because before that point I was a like a f***ing god, like I could do 
anything. Right then and there I went from being that guy that could 
do anything to, oh f*** I could die, this s**ks. It was very unnerving 
actually. 
 —Survey Subject 1 
 
While the threat to a teammate’s life is considered both severe and critical, 
the threat to one’s own life is perhaps the most direct signal to a leader that he is 
in a state of crisis. It would appear that many reactions to the threat to one’s own 
life are merely instinctual or automatic, but the emotions felt during these 
moments are internalized and cognitively processed; participants remarked, 
“things started to escalate for me. Of course, heartrate, everything sort of through 
the roof,” “adrenaline just goes, you know we’re not practicing anymore,” and 
“like nothing I’ve ever felt in my life.”102  
However, as one becomes more experienced, even direct threat to life can 
lose its sensebreaking effect. One participant described an unnerving terror flow 
through his mind as he felt his own blood running down his leg after being shot 
by enemy machinegun fire. He described an instant and clear understanding of 
his own mortality. However, when describing the next time he was wounded he 
said that he “felt calm,” and thought to himself, “I know how this feels, I survived it 
the first time.”103 This indicates that circumstances needed to bring about 
sensebreaking are dependent on the experience of the individual in the situation. 
It is no surprise that more seasoned leaders have a deeper intuition for the 
battlefield and as such are less apt to experience combat sensebreaking.104 It is 
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for this reason that participants in this study used experiences from earlier 
deployments in their career when describing chaotic environments. As their 
experience grew, what was once chaotic became routine. However, should 
combat sensebreaking occur, leaders are left to face a situation for which they 
were not fully prepared. It is at this point that they transition into the next phase of 
the decision-making process.  
C. COMBAT SENSEMAKING 
I was selected and trained for my capacity to do that, to problem 
solve quickly, make decisive calls, to manage a sky full of assets, 
manage a gunfight, manage a CASEVAC and make the decisions. 
 —Survey Subject 5 
 
Things slow way down, the physiological response to having 
endorphins and adrenaline dumped into your system… I’m hyper 
sensitive, I can distinctly remember dust in the air, I can remember 
the feel of the butterfly trigger, the shaking, the rhythm of the 50 Cal 
at the time…and real appreciation for things that are actually 
unfolding all around. 
 —Survey Subject 2 
 
To decide upon a corrective course of action once combat sensebreaking 
occurs, one must first reestablish their status quo. Leaders must take stock of 
their new circumstances; this is combat sensemaking. This process can unfold in 
a matter of minutes and its result will inform the decisions made in response to 
the crisis. Effective leaders are well adept at rapid combat sensemaking and in 
special operations, they are selected specifically for their ability to do so.105  
In combat, this step consists of first collecting oneself, essentially mentally 
slowing down the velocity of the situation. Next, leaders must establish the 
current capabilities of both their team and the enemy. This process can be 
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expedited when there exists cohesion within the team, allowing one to delegate 
tasks and focus on developing an understanding of the chaos.106 Table 4 shows 
the components of combat sensemaking.  
Table 4.   Combat Sensemaking 
 
 
1. Collecting Yourself 
First, the leader must establish situational awareness regarding his current 
status, the status of his team and that of the enemy. To clarify his relative 
position to the enemy, he must first attempt to mitigate or remove immediate 
enemy threats. Identifying immediate threats is a task that can be as simple as 
looking for the muzzle flash of enemy rifles. The ability to do this does not, in fact, 
separate effective decision makers from less effective ones. The differentiating 
factor is the ability to identify these threats, work to eliminate them, and 
simultaneously establish the best possible understanding of the unfolding 
situation.107 In April 2004, during the early stages of the war in Iraq, one leader’s 
ability to do just this was tested under fire. 
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Similar to many of the experiences shared throughout the interview 
process, this event began as a routine mission. The participant was in charge of 
a routine patrol in a hostile area of the country. While patrolling the city, he 
manned the 50 Caliber machine gun mounted to his vehicle and remained alert 
for any enemy activity, which seemed highly likely given his teams operating 
area. As his vehicle passed an alley, there was a split second of perfect 
illumination, allowing him to see two combatants carrying an RPG launcher. 
Instinctively, he turned his gun toward the alley and opened fire. While what 
followed happened in mere moments, to him it felt like an eternity.108  
The two enemy fighters fired the first RPG round as the rest of his team 
turned to provide supporting fire. However, two enemy fighters with RPGs were 
not the only combatants in the area. As they fired 3–4 more rockets, additional 
enemy joined in the fight, firing on the team with small arms from nearby 
buildings. It was clear at this moment that the team had found itself in a well-laid 
ambush. It was at this point that the team leader exhibited his ability to quickly 
identify the threat, and develop an understanding of the unfolding situation.109  
The threat was obvious and immediate; the team was receiving RPG and 
small arms fire. The situation itself had an SOP that dictated a certain response. 
However, in this case, that procedure would have determined the response to be 
an immediate acceleration of the patrol through the ambush to break contact with 
the enemy. Instead, he directed his team to drive directly into the ambush to 
overwhelm the enemy. Within a few moments, the enemy’s ambush position had 
been obliterated. He had based this decision on his understanding of the 
surrounding area. Since he knew that the entire area was hostile, he believed 
that the most prudent course of action was to eliminate the immediate threat.110  
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This decision would later show its merit. The team would soon find that if 
they had driven through the ambush, they would have found themselves in the 
middle of a planned secondary ambush. Instead, the enemy in the second 
ambush position was forced to leave their concealed location and attempt to 
engage the team out in the open. This was a major disadvantage for the enemy 
and they too were quickly eliminated once they attempted to engage the team.111  
2. Establishing Status of Team 
I’ve got three conversations going on at once. I’m making sure that 
the assets are looking at what I want them to look at…updating 
higher headquarters that they’re moving the CASEVAC, and I’m 
waiting for updates from my troop chief. 
 —Survey Subject 5 
 
Decision-making in chaos requires one to not only have an understanding 
of the obstacles he needs to overcome, but also the tools that are at his disposal. 
In the case of these small unit teams, the most important tools are one’s 
teammates.112 Therefore, to conduct combat sensemaking one must ascertain 
the status of one’s team.  
First, a leader must account for what combat power he has lost as a result 
of enemy action. In some instances, casualties can be removed from the combat 
area, but in on-going chaotic circumstances they often can only be taken out of 
the line of direct fire. The net effect is the loss of the combat power of the 
causalities, as well as those needed to care for them. Therefore, it is crucial that 
while establishing what tools are available for use in dealing with the situation, 
the leader understands the functionality of the people on his team. 
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While human tools are considered most critical, leaders must also take 
stock of the functionality of their equipment and other support assets. Equipment 
malfunctions can quickly place intense pressure on a leader during chaos. A 
number of participants referred to issues concerning vehicle malfunctions, 
weapons issues, and failures of communication equipment as part of their 
chaotic environment. For example, the failure of communications equipment 
could affect both the ability to maneuver as a team, as well as the ability to direct 
air support assets appropriately.113  
In Afghanistan, one ODA team leader had to make such an assessment 
while in pursuit of a group of Taliban fighters who had just attempted to ambush 
his team. Just after the ambush was launched and proved ineffective, the team 
leader turned his armored convoy up a steep ridgeline directly toward the enemy. 
While moving, he ordered the gunners on the vehicles to engage the enemy with 
their mounted Mark 19s. However, not one, but both guns failed to fire as the 
enemy hurried to flee the area. The team leader had to quickly discern which 
weapons systems were still available for rapid engagement against the 
enemy.114  
Support from the Afghan National Army (ANA) had also been attached to 
his element, but in this case they provided no help. In fact, when assessing the 
situation as it played out, the team leader realized that the ANA had failed to 
follow him up the ridgeline. Not to be deterred, he radioed a request for air 
support to aid in the pursuit of the Taliban element, but none was available. It is 
at this moment that he had to fully consider the status of his team. He was 
operating with two armored vehicles, but neither had a functioning mounted 
weapon. His ANA support element had failed to follow him, leaving his unit split. 
And lastly, he had no air support. As a result, he stalled his pursuit of the enemy 
to consolidate his team and assess his combat power. Having survived an 
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ambush in a highly hostile area of Afghanistan and knowing that the route back 
to base would soon be drawing Taliban attention, he ultimately decided to hasten 
the team’s withdrawal from the area.115 Had he not properly assessed his team’s 
status he may have made the decision to pursue the enemy, which could have 
proven catastrophic.  
3. Clarifying Status of Enemy 
A leader will have some level of understanding of the status of the enemy 
in a crisis; this is to say that he will be aware of an enemy presence, otherwise 
there would be no combat aspect to combat sensemaking. However, his 
situational awareness of the strength and disposition of the enemy may have 
been degraded as a result of combat sensebreaking, and the struggle to regain it 
is expressed via comments, such as, “I had to maintain awareness,” “I wanted 
more situational awareness,” and “Situational awareness is key.”116 A leader’s 
ability to quickly grasp the enemy disposition in a firefight can easily mean the 
difference between life and death. In counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, 
leaders have an increasingly difficult challenge as the enemy dresses the same 
as the civilian population; there are no uniforms or other such traditional means 
to aid in combat sensemaking.117  
4. Relying on Others 
Once a leader has collected himself, established the status of both his 
team and his enemy, he must then delegate appropriately. This allows him to 
reduce the number of variables factoring into his decision process so that he can 
focus on only those that require his specific skill set. One participant illustrated 
this when discussing a chaotic situation in Afghanistan.  
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The participant and his team were setting up to surround a building in a 
known Taliban safe haven. The intent was to conduct a “call-out,” in which they 
would inform the occupants of the building that they were surrounded and 
request them to peacefully exit and surrender. This had become a common tactic 
when conducting missions under the cover of darkness. However, it turned out 
that the occupants were aware of the team’s presence and had prepared to 
fight.118  
As the team surrounded the building, an occupant, who was in fact a 
Taliban leader, blindly tossed a grenade from within the compound walls. The 
team lead referred to the result of the Taliban leader’s effort as sheer luck on the 
part of the enemy, as the grenade landed right in front of a group of his 
teammates. A moment later, the team leader would be operating with four 
wounded team members. 
Faced with a now-ongoing firefight, four wounded team members, a 
hostile general area and unchanged mission objectives, the team leader had too 
many variables to handle. As a highly trained and experienced combat leader, 
any number of these factors were well within his skill set to handle, however, 
there were certain variables that he was best suited to handle and others that he 
could delegate to reduce the complexity of the situation. In this case, he was able 
to rely on a Senior Enlisted member of his team to manage the Casualty 
Evacuation (CASEVAC) process while he focused on the ongoing firefight.119 
Certainly, it was within this leader’s capability to manage a CASEVAC, but he 
was using his authority to delegate to reduce the number of complex variables he 
faced.120  
Delegation in this sense should not be conflated with delegation in 
decision-making. Instead, it is a means to diffuse complexity to allow for more 
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efficient combat sensemaking. Special operations leaders espouse trust among 
their team as being a key factor in their ability to operate.121 When describing an 
intense firefight, one leader stated of a senior team member, “If I needed 
something, he wanted to anticipate.” When asked what advice he would give to a 
young leader, another participant said simply, “I would tell him to trust his 
guys.”122 This trust and faith in one’s team is crucial in the process of reducing 
complexity to better conduct combat sensemaking.  
D. DECISION POINT 
You have to make these decisions on just the amount of 
information that comes to you, it’s never the amount you need. 
 —Survey Subject 5 
 
At this point in the process, the leader is now ready to make a decision. 
He has gathered as much information as possible, given the severe time 
constraints and has consolidated that information during the combat 
sensemaking phase. In almost every case, the leader knows that his decision 
must be direct and clear and that it is being made with limited information.123 As 
a result, his first inclination is toward eliminating eminent danger, followed by 
providing clear and consistent direction, and finally ensuring a unified team effort. 
The flow of this process, as derived from the participant data, is illustrated in 
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Table 5.   Decision Point 
 
 
1. Eliminating Threats 
At this point in the decision-making process, a leader has assessed 
enemy strength and is aware of his own combat capability. As a result, he is able 
to make a determination regarding his relative position to the enemy and decide 
if he either has the upper hand or if he needs to break contact. In these cases, 
leaders ascribe to the doctrine that one should never lose the initiative. This is to 
say that if one feels he has the upper hand, he should aggressively engage the 
enemy.124  
However, if the leader is unsure of the balance of combat power, he must 
decide how to proceed. In one instance, a leader determined that the prudent 
course of action was exfiltration of the target area. However, in another situation 
the leader remarked, “We’re not going to cower with our tail between our legs 
and head back to base.”125 The tactical efficacy of either action is not important 
here, but instead demonstrates that in individual cases, leaders decide to either 
eliminate the threat with force, or eliminate the threats ability to exert force on 
their team by removing themselves from the danger.  
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2. Following Through 
In regards to decision making, never ever, ever be indecisive.  You 
have to make a decision. 
 —Survey Subject 1 
 
One of the most apparent narratives throughout the study was the need to 
be decisive. For the participants this did not simply mean making a decision, but 
instead it meant making a decision, sticking to it, and seeing it through to its end. 
This does not mean that a leader cannot adjust his plan as the situation unfolds, 
only that adjustments need to be made as clear and definitive as the original 
command. As leaders, these men know that their subordinates are looking to 
them for guidance and that their failure to provide it can lead to disaster in 
combat.126 Therefore, it is paramount that during chaotic circumstances leaders 
follow through on their decisions.  
One participant made this point clear when discussing the decisions he 
made after his team found themselves in an ambush. With his team receiving 
direct enemy machinegun fire he had two options, either dismount the vehicles 
and assault the enemy position, or stay in the vehicles and attempt to engage the 
enemy with the mounted weapons. He ultimately decided to dismount and 
assault the enemy on foot. Upon reflection, he said that either decision could 
have been right or wrong, but the important focus was to give clear and concise 
orders. “Flip flopping will get guys killed.”127  
The point, he said, is that when you are being shot at, everyone is scared, 
and it is with that fear that people make bad decisions. This is why orders must 
be simple and direct. Otherwise, “more people get hurt, more people get 
confused, people get lost, [and] eventually people are going to die.” He went on 
to say that as a leader, one is expected to be able to cope better with that fear 
than his subordinates and to make better decisions. He elaborated that many 
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subordinates may be feeling much more fear than you and need you to be 
decisive and make the best decision for the entire team.128 It is for this reason 
that you must not only make a clear decision, but also follow through.  
Another participant echoed this sentiment stating, “No matter what 
decisions you’re making as long as you’re making a decision, you have to do 
something. Your guys are looking for you to do something.” “You don’t 
necessarily make the right decisions every single time, but you learn from 
those.”129 Such comments serve to reinforce the participants’ belief that leaders 
must provide clear direction even when uncertainty exists.  
3. Delegating 
A leader’s faith that his team will both follow and execute his orders 
enables him to act rapidly; he is able to decide on a course of action for one part 
of his team, consider that task handled, and move on to directing another part.130 
One participant remarked about his team, “I didn’t have to question if they were 
instinctively going to understand what needed to happen.”131 This freedom allows 
leaders to focus on directing their team rather than micromanaging it.132 
The participant’s in this study cited many instances of delegation that 
allowed the leader to focus on overseeing the operation and not get bogged 
down in the tasks for which he had competent personnel. As one participant put 
it, “If you’re doing the sergeants job, who’s doing the officer’s job?”133 The ability 
to delegate tasks to capable personnel allows the officer to focus on maintaining 
overall situational awareness. For many, there was at least one or two individuals 
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that the leader referred to as “fire and forget” team members, allowing the officer 
to “worry about the big picture” and avoid getting “down in the weeds.”134  
E. EXPERIENCE 
Each step of the decision-making process as described has been 
influenced by previous individual and team experiences of the leaders of these 
small combat units. Building on their advanced training, their operational 
experience, or the real-time exposure to combat operations in which they were 
forced to react and respond under chaotic conditions, heavily influenced their 
ability to progress through the decision-making process (see Table 6). Reliance 
on past experience is one of the key factors contributing to an individuals’ ability 
to make a decision, and within the decision-making cycle, would contribute to the 
resilience of these individuals when faced with situations that would induce 
sensebreaking.135 Combat exposure, specifically combat stress, has been cited 
as one factor that positively influences resilience for SOF leaders.136  
Table 6.   Experience 
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Increased experience, up to a certain threshold, builds confidence and the 
ability to focus on key variables while eliminating extraneous information, all 
within shorter periods of time.137 In this way, experience is also a critical aspect 
of sensemaking.138 Many SOF units are at a distinct advantage over other 
military forces, in that they are continually deployed for shorter deployment 
lengths in a variety of combat or contested environments, so they have extensive 
and consistent exposure to unique conditions. This exposure to a broad 
spectrum of previously encountered experiences instills an adaptability and 
readiness for future scenarios that assists the individual in more rapidly making 
sense of the variables in the new situation.  
The two primary categories identified in this study within the experience 
realm concerned (1) Individual military experience of the SOF officer prior to 
joining the team in which the chaotic incident occurred, and (2) team experience 
that occurred either prior to or during the deployment in which the chaotic 
incident occurred. For all of the participants in this study, prior individual 
experience included previous duty assignments with conventional units. In fact, 
many of the experiences that these individuals chose to recount were from their 
deployments with conventional units. The decision to choose those events could 
have been due to a number of factors. For some, the timing of either the war at 
that point in their career, their individual level of exposure to chaotic events, or 
lack of subsequent chaotic incidents could have been the deciding factor for their 
selection of that event. Regardless, the inclusion of chaotic events spanning both 
conventional and special operations missions provides a richer dataset and 
allows for a broader range of applicability of the findings.  
The individual experience described by the participants ranged from 
innocuous accounts from prior duty stations and training events to previous 
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deployments with other conventional and special operations units, to highly 
chaotic incidents with previous teams. The participants recounted these events 
as a means to describe the cumulative effect that prior experience had on their 
reactions and responses to future events. For many, the exposure to and lessons 
learned from these experiences greatly contributed to their ability to act more 
quickly and more efficiently in subsequent scenarios. For most participants, their 
individual experiences increased their confidence and decreased both cognitive 
and physical responses to future events. For example, one individual had been in 
a firefight and suffered a bullet wound to his leg. The first time he experienced 
this type of injury, he said he was in shock, his heart rate and emotional 
response to the situation escalated. The second time he was injured, he was 
calm; having experienced an injury before, he knew how to maintain control of 
and better respond to the situation.139  
In addition to individual experience, prior team experience also had a 
significant effect on the leader’s ability to make decisions that affected both 
himself and his team. Prior experience with the same unit contributed to a better 
understanding of the overall team dynamic, which allowed him to anticipate his 
team members’ actions and gain confidence in their abilities to respond 
appropriately under chaotic conditions. He was also able to better read their body 
language and determine if the group as a whole was picking up anything out of 
the ordinary, leading to a higher level of situational awareness.140 Familiarity with 
team members also reduced anxiety and the need to prove the participants value 
to the team. Both individual and team experience increased his ability to focus on 
the most critical variables within the chaotic environment.  
Due to the rank and time in service of our research participants, there was 
no lack of individual and team experience within the group. However, many of the 
participants cited their lack of experience with a particular scenario when 
recounting prior chaotic experiences. One participant described his first real 
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firefight as part of a Special Forces ODA conducting a Village Stability 
Operations mission. His team had deployed to a contested area of Southern 
Afghanistan and was trying to establish credibility with the local population as 
they intended to embed their small 12-man team within the local village. Their 
timing could not have been worse. The local poppy harvest was approaching and 
the Taliban were known to mass to take advantage of the local population 
through theft, extortion, and intimidation tactics, resulting in increased profits for 
future Taliban operations.141 
As expected, the participant’s ODA had to go head-to-head with the 
Taliban. They could not allow them the freedom of movement to take advantage 
of the local populace—that would have been considered mission failure. His ODA 
was partnered with an Afghan National Army element and had support from an 
Infantry Platoon in the area. The firefight began and immediately command and 
control began to break down. One of the Afghan Army soldiers was shot, and the 
situation was compounded by communication issues between the various 
elements on the ground. In addition, the team leader had not had significant 
experience conducting medical evacuation and it took some time to get a 
helicopter en route. Even when the helicopter arrived, it landed in the wrong spot. 
However, through it all, the team leader was able to maintain control of his 
individual element, eventually communicate and coordinate with the other two 
supporting elements, and regain control of the situation.142 Although the Afghan 
soldier died, the lessons learned about the actions of his team and those of the 
partner forces allowed for more cohesive and responsive joint operations in the 
future. The research participant cited this experience as having created a better 
understanding of the complexity of the environment and the critical elements that 
lead to the success or failure of the mission in these types of conditions.  
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F. COHESION 
The aspect of team cohesion, which is developed throughout the 
selection, training, and deployment processes, provides the last key component 
that enables a team leader to make a more effective decision, and enables a 
team to act at a higher level of performance.143 With respect to the decision-
making cycle outlined in this study, cohesion influences nearly every aspect of 
the process.  
Many studies identify two types of cohesion, task cohesion and social 
cohesion. Task cohesion refers to the “shared commitment among members to 
achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group.”144 Social 
cohesion describes the “extent to which group members like each other, prefer to 
spend their social time together, enjoy each other’s company, and feel 
emotionally close to one another.”145 Both of these types of cohesion are 
cultivated within the military at large, whose operations in combat environments 
place elevated levels of stress that test the cohesive bonds that tie groups 
together, and where divisive elements and a fracturing of the team can have 
devastating consequences.  
The definition of cohesion has changed over the years, but generally 
includes the concepts of trust, communication, and cooperation (see Table 4).146 
The degree of trust between team members is based on multiple factors but is 
enhanced by interaction and prior experience.147 Trust is one of the key 
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components for building team cohesion as high levels of trust facilitate more 
open communication and willingness to cooperate.148 Unlike the conventional 
military, SOF units are typically deployed in contested and ungoverned spaces 
as part of a small team. Without the advantage of a large supportive force, these 
small teams need to have extremely high levels of cohesion to maintain high 
levels of performance in such adverse conditions.149 Under high levels of stress, 
team members also tend to rely on the authority and decision-making ability of 
their leaders which is further enabled by high levels of cohesion.150 This critical 
factor produces multiple benefits that enhance a team leader’s information 
processing ability to make rapid decisions. 
An individual is only able to cognitively handle a certain amount of 
pressure represented by such elements as stress, information, physical arousal, 
etc.151 As discussed in the decision point stage of the decision-making cycle, 
delegation can be critical to a leader’s ability to focus on the most important task 
at hand. The development of a highly cohesive team, specifically through trust 
and cooperation, allows the team leader the ability to delegate tasks to other 
team members. This delegation of tasks distributes the workload and decisions 
being processed by the individual in the leadership position. This was evidenced 
on multiple occasions whereby the team leader praised his team members for 
taking over such critical tasks such as weapons systems, air coordination and 
reporting responsibilities.152 The team leader was then able to focus on a smaller 
number of variables, giving them his attention more exclusively and more quickly. 
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Nowhere is this more important than when a unit suffers a casualty. Due 
to the cohesive nature of combat units, team members feel like family and when 
one of them is hurt the mission changes dramatically. Typically, the team leader 
is forced to shift his priorities to treatment and medical evacuation while letting 
others handle other aspects of the fight.153 But what happens when it is the team 
leader himself that is the casualty? One of our participants recounted his first 
major injury while on a deployment to Iraq during a heightened period of the war. 
The team leader was out with his unit when a conflict erupted with the enemy 
and he was shot during the initial part of the firefight. One of his men radioed that 
he, the team leader, had been shot, but there was no time to pull back from the 
fight, nor would he have wanted them to at this point. The priority for him was to 
make sure everyone else made it out safely, and his team knew that. They were 
able to make it through the ambush although he suffered additional shrapnel in 
his knee and elbow from grenades being thrown by the enemy as they cleared 
the ambush site.154 
Although he was terrified at being injured for the first time, most of his 
concern was for his men, whom he praised effusively for their actions that night. 
During the discussion, he recounted the relationships he had with his driver and 
the squad leader, both of whom he trusted implicitly and with whom he felt 
incredibly comfortable. Their experiences together had forged the type of working 
relationship that is critical to combat units. For this, he felt fortunate.155  
This enabled him to make decisions more rapidly and to focus only on 
certain aspects of the fight knowing that his soldiers “were doing exactly what 
they should be.” This level of cohesion cannot be created on the fly. As he put it, 
“In this situation we had been working together for a long time so…they knew 
exactly what I wanted; if I was doing something they could tell what I was doing. 
If they were doing something, without verbally saying it, I knew what they were 
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doing. It also has to do with [the fact that] we were living on a patrol base, we 
lived, ate, slept. I knew all their wives, they knew my wife, I knew all their kids, 
they knew my kids; it was that kind of organization.”156 
For those in combat units, this cohesive atmosphere is nothing new. 
Troops forge deep bonds during training and out in the field and never miss an 
opportunity to prove their worth to the team. As this team leader put it, “There is a 
weird phenomenon with soldiers, if you’re not there you’re an outsider. If you’re 
there with your dudes getting shot at, you can talk about it later, it’s like a 
cohesion thing.”157 Particularly with those in command positions, this is critical. 
They are the ones responsible for leading their men in combat, for ensuring that 
everyone is well-trained and ready for whatever may come, and feel accountable 
for every injury and loss that affects their team. However, those that are good 
leaders, know that they are not the only capable individuals on the team. 
As expected, those operating within a cohesive team relied on the 
feedback and advice of their team members, specifically those with the most 
experience. This use of confidants and experts has been discussed by 
Eisenhardt as crucial to rapid strategic decision-making.158 This study found that 
this also holds true in rapid tactical decision-making. The feedback from other 
members of the team increases the situational awareness of the commander 
allowing him to move more rapidly from sensebreaking through sensemaking. 
Multiple team leaders cited their platoon sergeants, their radio telephone 
operators, and other key members as being critical factors allowing them to 
reaffirm their decisions and assisting them in choosing among multiple courses of 
action. During the planning phases of an operation, “everybody kind of had a 
vote.”159 In the field, although the leader had final decision-making authority, they 
often consulted with their more experienced and trusted team members before, 
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during and after firefights. One participant “wouldn’t do much without bouncing it 
off of” his team sergeant. Another would not pursue any course of action without 
getting agreement from his troop chief.160 These close-knit relationships were a 
prevalent theme throughout the research pool. This dependence on other team 
members can have a negative effect if the level of cohesion within the team is 
low, but as discussed, cohesion within small combat units is cultivated early and 
often.161 The reliance on the expertise of other team members was critical to 
increasing the confidence necessary to be more decisive under chaotic 
conditions.162 A cohesive team provides a level of comfort, capability and support 
that instills the type of self-assurance required for making rapid decisions. 
With respect to small combat units, team cohesion has a synergistic 
effect, enabling small units to perform at much higher levels than each individual 
could have done on his own. This is a product of the interaction and collaboration 
between the team members that results in increased overall group 
performance.163 However, many of the participants cited their relationships and 
interactions as having a direct effect on their own individual performance, 
displaying a two-fold effect of cohesion on both individual and team 
performance.164 
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V. FINDINGS 
From analysis of the data emerges a non-linear model consisting of six 
key attributes: status quo, combat sensebreaking, combat sensemaking, decision 
point, experience, and cohesion (Figure 3). First, there exists the established 
norms of an operation which is dictated by mission requirements and planning. 
Chaotic environments arise when this status quo is dramatically changed as a 
result of combat sensebreaking. A return to order is then achieved by the 
process of combat sensemaking, and it is after this that a leader is able to 
process events and decide on a course of action rather than simply reacting to 
the situation in front of him. The level of individual and team experience by the 
leader influences how quickly he can move between the stages of this decision 
cycle. Finally, the cohesion fostered within these teams creates a synergy that 
elevates the leader’s ability to make decisions under chaos and the overall 
performance of the team in these conditions. 




In this study, combat sensebreaking differs from the more traditional views 
of sensebreaking as described by Pratt.165 While there are a number of key 
distinctions as indicated, they are all derived from the key difference in the types 
of people who find themselves in combat, how they are trained, the situations 
they are prepared to face, and the severity of what an adversary must do to 
induce combat sensebreaking. Once combat sensebreaking has occurred and 
the leader has come to terms with his situation, it is incumbent upon him to 
regain his bearings and make sense of his new circumstances.  
In combat, a leader must collect the right amount of information, which is 
typically highly limited, to inform a timely decision; this process is called combat 
sensemaking. Sometimes this means getting “just enough” information in order to 
move forward. He must gain an understanding of the status of his own force, the 
status of the enemy, and then begin to focus only on the most important 
variables. Once this is complete, he is able to make a decision. Participants 
placed great importance on arriving to this decision quickly and ensuring that the 
resulting course of action was understood clearly by their subordinates; 
ambiguous or impotent commands turn chaos into disaster.  
The model presented is derived directly from the interviews and 
encapsulates the decision-making process as it was described by the 
participants of the study. However, as mentioned earlier, there exists one 
additional step in the process which is unique to decision-making in the chaos of 
combat.  
A. SENSE CONVERSION 
While both the sensebreaking and sensemaking process have been 
previously explored in non-combat settings, this study uncovered an additional 
step in the decision-making process that takes place between the two in a 
chaotic tactical combat environment. Sense conversion occurs at the moment in 
which one fully grasps the severity of their current circumstance. One must 
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recognize that despite prior extensive preparation or experience, he was 
unprepared for the circumstance being faced; it is only after this realization has 
occurred that he was able to begin to make sense of his surroundings and move 
forward in the decision-making process. When an individual already has 
experience in a specific situation he may have developed an intuition that 
enables him to transition from combat sensebreaking to combat sensemaking 
almost seamlessly, making sense conversion seem transparent. This is why the 
participants of this study nearly all chose situations earlier in their careers to 
describe chaotic environments. As they gained more experience and intuition, 
they found fewer situations requiring sense conversion, as fewer combat 
scenarios felt chaotic.  
In Table 7, the data shows that the process leading to sense conversion 
has two unique attributes: internalizing threats and accepting ambiguity. These 
may occur either independently or in combination, but each one can be sufficient 
to require sense conversion. 
Table 7.   Sense Conversion 
 
 
1. Internalizing Threats 
As discussed in combat sensebreaking, a threat to one’s life can have a 
profound sensebreaking effect. Experiencing a direct threat to life can leave a 
leader stunned, impacting his ability to think clearly and make decisions.166 The 
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ability to internalize the fear related to such threats so that one can begin the 
combat sensemaking process is a key component in sense conversion. This step 
is unique to this study in that it represents a distinct moment following 
sensebreaking that must occur for sensemaking to begin.  
Soldiers are often portrayed as fearless in the face of danger, even when 
their life is on the line. This characteristic is often further exaggerated when 
describing special operations leaders, such as the ones interviewed in this study. 
However, they were all able to recall with a high degree of clarity the physical 
and emotional responses they felt when faced with a tangible threat of death. 
Each of them described a distinct moment in which they realized the gravity of 
the situation they were facing, and this realization occurred in those moments 
after combat sensebreaking, but before the commencement of combat 
sensemaking.167  
The process of sense conversion with regard to internalizing threats was 
exemplified when described by one participant. While leading a patrol he found 
his team trapped in what he referred to as a perfectly laid ambush. As he began 
to maneuver his team into position to react to the threat, he felt his leg give way. 
It was not until he stood up and positioned himself in the cover of his Humvee 
that he felt his own blood running down his leg. He expressed what was running 
through his mind, “Right then and there I stopped being that guy that could do 
anything to, oh f*** I could die, this s**ks.”168 It is the ambush and wound that 
caused sensebreaking, but it was his ability to accept this threat, understand its 
ramifications, and overcome it that demonstrates sense conversion. It is not a 
lack of fear of death that allows these leaders to go from sensebreaking to 
sensemaking, but instead their ability to accept this tangible fear, internalize it, 
and move on.  
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2. Accepting Ambiguity 
Beyond accepting mortal danger, leaders also expressed the process of 
sense conversion when having to accept the ambiguity faced when their status 
quo was challenged after combat sensebreaking. The participants commonly 
discussed a panic-like state as they attempted to come to terms with the dynamic 
shift in their situation. One participant described this thought succinctly, “what the 
heck is going on and where are my guys?”169 The weight of not understanding 
the unfolding situation in a tactical setting must be accepted in a manner similar 
to accepting a threat to one’s life. Feeling lost in such dire circumstances also 
has the ability to stun, or shock, a leader. In such a state, he must be able to 
overcome this shock to conduct sensemaking; this is another form of sense 
conversion.  
In one scenario an interview participant described the shock he felt during 
an investigation into the explosion of an IED. This support-type mission had 
become routine by this point in his deployment. However, shortly after arriving he 
was taken aback when a second IED exploded near his team. Seconds later this 
shock was compounded with the eruption of small arms fire. His team had been 
split, an IED had exploded, and he did not know whether the split part of his team 
was responding with fire in the direction of the explosion, or if a firefight had 
begun. As a result, he described a moment of disorientation, not in the physical 
sense, but in the sense that he was not immediately able to process what had 
just happened. He said to himself, “Hey man, s**t just blew up,” (referring to the 
explosive nature of the situation), as if attempting to clarify and internalize the 
events unfolding.170 It was only after this that he described the ability to refocus 
and make sense of his surroundings; this illustrates the sense conversion 
process.  
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Sense conversion allows leaders in chaotic environments to transition 
from combat sensebreaking to combat sensemaking. Those who are able to do 
this more quickly have the ability to reduce the amount of time it takes to begin 
combat sensemaking and ultimately direct their teams in response to the 
situation. When time is a critical factor, as is the case in combat, the speed of 
sense conversion can have major ramifications on the success of the mission, as 
well as the safety of the team. With the addition of sense conversion the resulting 
decision-making process model is illustrated in Figure 4.  
Figure 4.  Revised Decision-Making Process 
 
 
B. EXPANDING THE INVERTED U 
To this point, the study has explored the critical components that both 
prepare and assist a SOF Officer to increase his capability to make decisions 
under chaotic conditions. A SOF officer undergoes selection and assessment, is 
trained both individually and as a team, conducts multiple deployments, and 
develops social bonds with his teammates that allow for a cohesive fighting unit. 
However, these components cannot just be added up to conclude that this is the 
whole picture. 
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As previously discussed, with an increase in environmental complexity 
comes an accompanying increase in stress, which affects performance. This type 
of relationship was originally modeled by Yerkes and Dodson as an inverted-
U.171 In the current study, it can be expressed that as the environment becomes 
more dynamic and the potential for information overload more probable, the 
ability to perform becomes degraded. If modified to incorporate the critical 
components identified by our SOF Officers as key to their increased ability to 
handle information overload, the model might be modified to reflect this layered 
effect (see Figure 5). Essentially, the Inverted-U curve of a SOF Officer has been 
expanded by these critical components. This allows for the maintenance of a 
high standard of performance at much higher levels of environmental complexity 
found within the chaotic conditions of combat and operations in contested and 
highly volatile areas. This model gives a sufficient outline for understanding 
decision-making capabilities of SOF officers, but does not encompass some of 
the key, more nuanced elements that enabled more rapid decision making.  
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Figure 5.  SOF Inverted-U 
 
 
When examining the data for less overt themes, one of the more 
interesting findings concerned the individual’s selection of the chaotic incident 
that he chose to discuss with the interviewer. More than one-third of the interview 
participants chose their first enemy engagement as the incident they recalled 
being the most chaotic. For those describing first-time contact experiences, they 
felt overwhelmed, of not being able to get all of the information they needed to 
get the situation under control. In one participant’s words, “despite my best 
efforts in a really small space in time, I wasn’t able to get accurate details right 
there in front of me.” Another individual recounting his first experience said that “it 
was really our first operation…I was not quite comfortable with it yet.”172 
This further supports the idea that experience reduces environmental 
complexity, or at least enables the individual to better process chaos after regular 
exposure. Multiple participants described being calm in subsequent crisis 
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situations. The first time one of the participants was shot, he described being 
terrified and said that the whole experience was very unnerving. However, his 
second injury in a later deployment was a completely different story. He was 
calm and was able to maintain control over both his emotions and the dynamic 
environment in which he was operating. In fact, multiple participants cited prior 
experience as having actually decreased their subsequent emotional responses 
to similar chaotic situations.173 These descriptions indicate the necessity of real-
world combat exposure for SOF operators to enable better cognitive responses 
to the flow of information during incidents of high-stress. Although training can 
simulate an operational environment, there is no substitute for the real thing. This 
is also different than just improving resilience; combat exposure is actually 
enhancing the information processing ability of these operators. Not only will they 
be psychologically stronger and able to withstand multiple deployments, they will 
be able to perform better within those complex environments.  
One unique part of the decision-making process that emerged was the 
use of negative visualization that allowed the individual to better prepare himself 
for crisis situations. Although previous studies found that training and preparation 
can decrease both physiological and emotional responses in the event the 
scenario occurs, our research participants went beyond the basics, describing 
the specific use of visualization and anticipation of negative events that helped 
them operate better when the operational environment deteriorated.174 As one 
participant put it, “You should be anticipating. You should be looking beyond the 
next move. This is a chess game.” Another respondent described that his team 
“constantly left the wire expecting to be ambushed.”175 In fact, many of the 
problems that these individuals encountered arose from situations that they had 
not expected. This is not unusual. You cannot possibly be trained in or 
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experienced with every situation, but it seems that some of these variables can 
be mitigated through the use of anticipation and negative visualization. Again, 
referring to the Inverted-U model, this type of cognitive preparation can help 
prevent the occurrence of information overload that could degrade performance 
under these conditions.  
Another key finding concerned additional capabilities created by both 
individual and team experiences in the combat environment. Repeat exposure to 
ambiguous and complex environments created the development of intuition 
during times of uncertainty. Many of the research participants described the 
development of a sixth sense during times of crisis. One research participant 
described how his multiple deployments and leadership positions had enabled 
him to get a “sixth sense that something is about to happen… [which makes you] 
perk up and take note of the situation.” In his case, it was an ambush during a 
deployment in Afghanistan. He described how he was able to better queue into 
the warning signs that were present, even when unable to pinpoint exactly what’s 
wrong. In fact, he described it as something “you should feel…almost before you 
recognize or understand it, you almost feel it.”176 He contributed that type of 
intuitive capability to practice, experience and repetition. And he was not the only 
one. Multiple other participants credited the combat environment with creating 
opportunities that led to the development of intuition, and how that capability 
provided them with a better sense of the environment, a critical factor when 
operating in uncertainty.177 
The development of intuition through combat experience was not limited 
solely to the individual’s ability to cue into their environment, but also to intuit the 
actions of their teammates as well. One participant described how constant 
contact in an operational environment develops in-depth knowledge of 
teammates enabling one to “read their cues and know the situation.”178 This was 
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not the only perk resulting from the development of intra-team intuition; in fact, 
one of the more interesting developments concerned how team cohesion and 
intuition affected the level of communication among team members. Although 
there was a high level of open communication both prior and following the 
chaotic incident, this study found that these highly cohesive teams required less 
communication when the incident was chaotic.  
One participant was questioned specifically on how he would have reacted 
with a less cohesive team, and responded that if he had not been working with 
soldiers he was comfortable with, he “would have had to [have] been more 
verbal.” When surrounded by a bunch of soldiers you do not know, “you have to 
be explicit…very controlled.” Another described how he and his troop chief 
wanted to be able to anticipate each other’s needs if things became chaotic.179 
This would have allowed them to operate during incidents of high stress with less 
communication necessary. When questioned about this relationship, he 
mentioned that it develops over time, and although they would have had to have 
potentially short conversations while that relationship develops, the ability to 
anticipate the needs and actions of your teammates is key to a smooth running 
operation.180 
Finally, another participant described that when the firefight began, there 
was “very little communication necessary,” and described that as a “beautiful 
thing.”181 He attributed the minimal communication not only to training, but to the 
caliber of people on his team and their prior experience and training with one 
another, which resulted in an instinctual understanding of each other’s actions 
and the events unfolding before them. Again, this previous experience among the 
team, both in training and in combat produced an almost intuitive response to 
actions between the team members, so that the need for communication 
decreased while still maintaining high levels of performance. This freed the team 
                                            
179 Barrett, NPS IRB. 
180 Barrett, NPS IRB. 
181 Barrett, NPS IRB. 
 68
leader from having to exert more control over his team and allowed him the 
ability to take that needed time for more crucial matters. This type of 
decentralization of power within organizations has been noted by Mintzberg,182 
and leads to more efficient operations under more complex environmental 
conditions.183 
For SOF commanders leading small combat units, being able to effectively 
operate within a complex and dynamic environment and making rapid decisions 
affecting themselves and their teammates is critical to the survival of the team 
and success of the mission. In fact, this study found that one of the most cited 
aspects of decision-making was the need to be decisive within the shortest time 
possible. Leaders are expected to immediately act under chaotic conditions to 
reestablish control.184 This study aimed to determine what the decision-making 
process of SOF officers operating in these conditions looked like and what key 
factors enabled their ability to make rapid decisions. As demonstrated by the 
Inverted-U model (see Figure 5), the layered effects of selection, training, 
experience and team cohesion built a framework by which the SOF leader was 
able to acquire the necessary skills to more effectively handle the information 
complexity of the chaotic situation and rapidly construct and execute life or death 
decisions. The ability to reduce information overload was achieved throughout 
this process.  
SOF officers are initially assessed and selected for their ability to face 
ambiguous and often intense environmental conditions, rapidly cycle through 
available course of action, and come to the best decision in the shortest time 
possible. The introduction of field tests and required interaction with fellow 
candidates demonstrates their ability to perform under simulated conditions and 
effectively interact, communicate and cooperate with potential future teammates. 
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Once selected, the SOF officer undergoes extensive individual and team training. 
Individual and team training instill the principles of combat action, often through 
SOPs and knowledge of battlefield tactics. Training scenarios that replicate real-
world situations and require consideration of contingencies and alternate options 
create an almost instinctual response when the individual is faced with similar 
circumstances in future combat conditions.  
However, what previous literature does not identify is the development of 
intuition and anticipation among team members. The team cohesion that results 
from both training and combat exposure leads to an increased understanding of 
the future behavior and actions of their teammates. This cohesion is founded on 
trust, communication and cooperation, which instills confidence and the ability to 
delegate tasks to other team members, reducing the complexity of the variables 
facing the decision-maker and the amount of time needed to complete the task at 
hand. Additionally, the relationships that develop through training and experience 
allow the individual a more heightened awareness of the team’s readiness and 
whether the situation is under control or something is amiss. 
Another key factor that seems almost counter-intuitive is the impact these 
relationships have on the level of communication necessary during combat 
operations. SOF units generally tout a flattened hierarchy, characterized by 
decentralized decision-making and transparent communication between team 
members. This held true, but what also emerged was the type of close-knit 
relationship that sometimes alleviated the need for cross-talk within the team. 
The high level of repetition, rehearsal and long-term training and experience 
among the team removed the type of explicit communication and strict control 
over team members that was evident in less cohesive team environments. 
Although communication was high prior to and following an operation, the level of 
communication needed during that operation decreased within cohesive teams. 
Additionally, consistent combat exposure further expanded their intuitive 
sense of the environment, allowing them to better read cues that clued them into 
changes in the environment. Prior experience decreased the emotional reaction 
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typically seen in first-time crisis situations and the use of negative visualization 
enabled them to act more rapidly and anticipate issues before being confronted 
by them. The research participants identified these elements as having increased 
their overall ability to make rapid decisions and perform at high levels in these 
chaotic environments. In essence, it is the combination of these critical factors 
that has produced these elite groups of soldiers, leading to them being referred 
to as “the tip of the spear.”185 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
Although this model demonstrates the process by which small tactical unit 
leaders make rapid decisions under chaotic conditions, it is composed only of 
individuals from the Army and Navy and therefore the applicability to other 
services is unknown. It is expected that the process of selection, training and 
experience for SOF teams within the Marine Corps would be the most similar to 
those in our research study, due to their use as ground forces and exposure to 
similar combat environments. However, the increase in joint operations over the 
past decade may have provided the type of experiences that would better 
replicate those in the current study, but future research is recommended. 
Another consideration for future research concerns the sample in the 
current study. Research participants were drawn from a pool of available 
students attending graduate school, and therefore, may not constitute the SOF 
community writ large. However, the backgrounds and experience of the 
individuals studied represented a wide range of ground-force missions, both 
conventional and SOF, over the past decade and the decision-making process 
remained consistent across the range of scenarios discussed. It is expected that 
the decision-making cycle would be applicable to small combat units within the 
conventional military, as the results were gleaned from incidents spanning both 
                                            




conventional and SOF experiences, with minimal variation noted in the decision-
making cycle between the two.  
It should also be noted that the sample was limited to special operations 
officers, many of whom espoused the importance of leadership in their non-
commissioned officers (NCOs). Interviews with NCOs in leadership positions 
could be conducted to further verify the soundness of the decision-making model 
presented in this study. Conversely, such interviews may illuminate difference in 
the decision-making process between officers and NCOs.  
Additionally, all participants provided narratives on experiences in 
contemporary warfare. The total temporal bounds of the sample narratives was 
little more than a decade. More longitudinally focused research should be 
conducted to determine how this process has either changed or remained 
consistent over time. Despite this, the consistency of this model across disparate 
battlefields over a decade, and among both Navy and Army special operations 
leaders does suggest validity in the findings presented with regard to the 
timeframe investigated.  
The applicability of this type of model to civilian organizations is unknown, 
although many of the elements identified in the decision-making model are 
present in sectors, such as law enforcement, first responders and some 
environments encountered by emergency medical personnel. Generally, these 
types of fields do have a more rigid hierarchy and have more support than a 
small unit in a combat environment, but there are teams within these fields that 
do place emphasis on the type of training and experience that develop high 
levels of cohesion and would operate under crisis situations in a manner similar 
to small combat units. 
The expanding terrorist threat to the United States will necessitate an 
increased need for small-scale, flexible forces capable of conducting operations 
in far-flung locations and under diverse environmental conditions.186 This rests 
                                            
186 Robinson, “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,” 3–4. 
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squarely on SOF, as they are currently the primary action force for these types of 
operations. The size, structure and environment of SOF has rapidly changed 
since the attacks of September 11, 2001. They have gone from a size of 
approximately 33,000 soldiers to upward of 74,000.187 The budget has nearly 
tripled in that time. However, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, a decreased fiscal 
budget, and mandated military personnel cuts are just a few of the changes 
being brought about by policy and decision-makers that continue to influence the 
future of SOF.188  
In response to the increasing need to expand its forces, the SOF 
community created the 18X Program, which changed the prerequisites 
necessary to attend SFAS.189 Prior to 2002, all soldiers interested in attending 
SFAS had to be current enlisted soldiers or officers with a minimum rank 
requirement.190 Once the 18X Program was created, individuals without any 
previous military experience could apply directly to attend SFAS following Basic 
and Advanced Individual Training, two prerequisites upon initial entry into the 
military. Many current SOF members have been highly skeptical of this program, 
but it is uncertain how the soldiers being recruited by this program will influence 
the Inverted-U Model presented in this study.191  
                                            
187 Turse, “Why Are U.S. Special Operations Forces Deployed in Over 100 Countries?”  
188 Lohaus, “A Precarious Balance,” http://www.aei.org/publication/a-precarious-balance-
preserving-the-right-mix-of-conventional-and-special-operations-forces/. 
189 Jack Murphy, “Why Are Standards Plummeting in the Ranger Assessment and Selection 
Program?,” July 12, 2012, http://sofrep.com/9028/why-are-standards-plummeting-in-the-ranger-
assessment-and-selection-program/. 
190 Banks, The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection; California Army 
National Guard, “Inside Special Forces,” 2015, https://enlistspecialforces.wordpress.com/sf-
training-pipeline/sfas/. 
191 Blake Miles, “The SF Babies (Part I),” January 29, 2014, http://sofrep.com/31708/sf-
babies-part/; Shadow Spear, “Need Advice on the 18X Option,” May 5, 2011, 
http://www.shadowspear.com/vb/threads/need-advice-on-the-18x-option.9972/. 
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